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Resumo 
 
A pesquisa foi conduzida numa joint venture internacional formada entre uma empresa brasileira e 
uma espanhola, localizada no Brasil, operando na indústria de cosméticos. Os CEOS de ambas 
empresas foram entrevistados. As entrevistas ocorreram em agosto de 2001 e maio de 2003 
acompanhando a evolução do fenômeno pesquisado. Todas as entrevistas foram transcritas e a 
análise de conteúdo foi utilizada para desvendar temas teóricos que estruturavam os discursos de 
acordo ao modelo de pesquisa desenvolvido com base numa extensiva revisão da literatura. O 
modelo muniu a pesquisa de uma estrutura para traçar elementos teóricos diversos no 
desenvolvimento da joint venture. Em termos da compreensão de diferentes racionalidades 
dispostas pelos diferentes parceiros em seus discursos, foram desenvolvidas etapas dos dois países 
que possibilitaram um melhor mecanismo de interpretação. Teoricamente, aspectos da Teorias de 
Custo de Transação, da Teoria Institucional e da Dependência de Recursos puderam ser analisadas, 
em termos de racionalidades moldando os discursos, configurando as formas de decisão da joint 
venture. Com respeito às práticas, essas teorias devem ser consideradas como complementares 
em vez de caminhos alternativos para moldar o mundo: cada uma representa um elemento do 
trabalho discursivo que compõe a constituição da joint venture.   
 
 
Palavras-chave: Teoria institucional. Teoria dos Custos de Transação. Dependência de Recursos 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The research was conducted in an international joint venture (IJV) formed between a Brazilian and 
Spanish Company, located in Brazil, which operates in the cosmetics industry.  CEOs from both 
parent companies were interviewed. The interviews occurred at two points – August 2001 and May 
2003 – and sought to capture the evolution of the phenomena being researched. All the interviews 
were transcribed and content analysis was used to uncover the theoretical themes that 
underpinned or framed their discourse, according to a research model developed on the basis of an 
extensive literature review. The model provided a frame with which to trace diverse theoretical 
elements in the development of the venture. In terms of understanding the different rationalities 
deployed by the different partners in their discourse, it was the development stage of the two 
countries that provided the best interpretive device. Theoretically, aspects of Transaction Cost 
Economics, Institutional Theory, and Resource Dependence could all be seen, in terms of the 
rationalities shaping the discourses, to underlie the decision to form the IJV. In respect to practice, 
these theories should be regarded as complementary rather than alternative ways of framing the 
world: each represents an element of the discursive work that went into the constitution of the IJV.  
 
Keywords: Institutional theory. Transaction cost economics. Resource dependence.   
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Introduction 
Increasingly, firms are regarded “as placed 
within a network of inter-organizational 
relationships that are crucial to their success 
and survival” (Gulati, 1995, p. 619). Analytic 
focus has shifted from the firm to the 
network of relations in which it is embedded. 
Research concerning internationalisation in 
the 1990s demonstrated that strategic 
alliances were one of the dominant 
organizational forms for success in 
competitive environments (Child; Faulkner, 
1998; Rodrigues, 1999). For as long as 
strategic relations were conceptualized as 
being between essentially similar 
organizational entities they posed a problem 
only of focus and extension for analysis: 
shifting the focus from the focal organization 
to the alliances that it entered into and 
extending it to incorporate suppliers and 
other up and down stream organizations, all 
of which could be assumed to be essentially 
‘economically rational’ actors. These 
assumptions might work well when the 
alliances are formed between similar 
corporate entities from the same country, or 
ones that are very similar. However, what 
happens when the alliance is between 
organizations from developing and developed 
countries? Does the level of development of 
institutions and practices shape the nature of 
the alliance in determinate ways? It is these 
research questions that the paper will 
explore.  
To understand inter-organizational 
relationships between organizations in 
countries with different cultures and at 
different stages of development one needs to 
understand the effects of economic and 
political instability on alliance formation.  
Significant advances have been made in 
understanding the rational motives 
underlying the formation of alliances, by 
Ebers (1997), for instance, who notes that it 
is because of the dominant emphasis on 
rational motives from an economic 
perspective, that when such ventures involve 
a partner from a developing country, 
important institutional and power aspects are 
neglected. What is seen to be rational is 
defined in terms of the accounts that form 
the sine qua non of economics rather than 
the accounts of the actors who are actually 
constructing what they take to be rational 
action. An account in terms of economic 
motives per se is thus insufficient to explain 
the emergence of inter-organizational 
networking relationships or their 
organizational form if these accounts do not 
consider the diverse rationalities of the actors 
themselves (eg, Ebers, 1997).  Thus, 
following the logic of Ebers (1997), we 
emphasize those conditions that facilitate and 
constrain the formation of inter-
organizational relationships, such as the 
particularities of the institutional 
environment, and the dominant social 
institutions in which they are formed.  
Institutions, by definition, are enduring 
rather than fleeting: while they may involve 
market relations they also involve political and 
cultural relations.  The present paper focuses 
on the formation of a strategic alliance 
involving a partner from a developing and a 
developed country. The paper avoids the 
common focus on the motives for establishing 
alliances – at the level of the strategic actor – 
in favor of looking at what happens in strategic 
action when such alliances are formed.   
In the present work the focus is on 
how contingencies at the institutional level 
have an impact on the formation of a specific 
type of network-joint venture. The analysis 
employs a phase model for the formation of a 
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joint venture, adapted from the works of 
Gulati (1998), which conjointly considers 
political issues (discussed in the resource 
dependence perspective: RD), cultural aspects 
(addressed in institutional theory: IT), as well 
as economic considerations (transaction costs 
economics: TCE). Our innovative contribution 
extends this framework to international joint 
ventures (IJVs) involving a partner from a 
developing country.  The formal research 
question framing this work is simple:  How do 
the institutional environments of countries in 
different development stages affect the 
formation of IJVs between organizations from 
such countries?   
 The remainder of this paper is 
organized as follows:  first, we will discuss 
the motives and contingencies underlying 
IJVs constituted by organizations from 
developing and developed countries.  Second, 
we will then discuss and construct 
appropriate theoretical foundations for such 
research.  Third, we present a case study 
exploring the implications of our proposed 
framework for such an IJV.  Finally, we 
conclude by describing how the effects of the 
institutional environments of countries in 
different development stages might frame 
the formation of IJVs. 
 
International Joint Ventures – motives 
and contingencies 
IJVs represent one specific type of 
collaborative venture formed by at least two 
parent organizations from different countries, 
resulting in a new organizational entity with 
shared equity (Gulati, 1998; Osborn and 
Baughn, 1990; Harrigan, 1988; Pfeffer and 
Nowak, 1976). Yeheskel, Zeira and Shenkar 
(2001) define equity international joint 
ventures (EIJVs) in terms of an independent 
legal organizational entity being jointly 
owned by two or more parent companies, 
where the headquarters of at least one of the 
parent companies is located outside the 
country in which the venture operates. Such 
a relationship typically entails considerable 
outlay of resources and creates enduring, and 
possibly irreversible, commitments between 
partners (Luo, 2001; Gulati and Westphal, 
1999). 
Harrigan (1988) explains that 
cooperative agreements such as strategic 
alliances differ from joint ventures because 
they do not involve shared equity. Because of 
this, cooperative agreements are often easier 
to terminate than EIJVs. On the other hand a 
joint venture may be preferred, since owners 
rarely pool their resources and efforts in 
cooperative agreements as they do when 
using joint ventures. Grandori and Soda 
(1995) focus on joint ventures as a 
proprietary network and emphasize that the 
economic relation constitutes an incentive 
system for sustaining cooperation. Joint 
ventures will be employed mainly in 
situations in which uncertainty and 
opportunism are particularly prevalent. 
Because joint ventures do not necessarily 
have a central coordinating firm driving the 
coalition, the power of the partners needs to 
be balanced, they suggest.  Similarly, Gulati 
(1998) suggests joint ventures (JVs) exhibit 
characteristics similar to hierarchical 
organization forms. Such JVs employ 
structural coordination mechanisms – 
information systems, strategic planning, and 
incentive systems – that are common in 
hierarchical organizations while Osborn and 
Baughn (1990) argue that JVs can be viewed 
as quasi-hierarchies, because they do not 
involve a complete pooling of the parent’s 
profit streams or the establishment of a 
single hierarchy.  
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IJVs are increasingly popular as a 
mechanism for entering new markets, and 
their complexity as well as the high degree of 
unsuccessful experiences with the form (Lane 
and Beamish, 1990; Fey and Beamish, 2001) 
has produced many analyses focusing on 
these problematic aspects.  Among the 
explanations for a lack of success and low 
performance of IJVs, the following internal 
and external factors have been proposed:  
1. The cultural differences between 
countries in which parent 
organizations are located (Child 
and Rodrigues, 2000; Rodrigues, 
1999)  
2. Differences in organizational 
cultural and climate (Fey and 
Beamish, 2001)  
3. Changes in the environment in 
which the JV operates – 
technological ruptures, legislative 
changes, government 
interventions, the achievement of 
the objective intended by one 
parent organization (so that the 
failure is only viewed as such by 
one partner) 
4. Power disputes between the 
venture partners: in  Gulati’s 
(1998:300) terms  the 
partnerships may not withstand 
rapid environmental changes, 
shifting partner priorities and 
orientations.   
Joint ventures in developing countries 
have specific problems in addition to those 
that are normally encountered. Managers of 
foreign partners often tend not to pay enough 
attention to the specific cultural and human 
characteristics of managers from developing 
countries, expecting that they will behave in 
much the same way as national managers or, 
sometimes, they tend to see managers from 
developing countries in a discriminatory way, 
as neither competent nor trustful managers. 
Under these circumstances IJVs in developing 
countries may not function as readily as 
desired as a mechanism for the transfer of 
knowledge and innovation.  Specific aspects 
of the way that the relations play out may act 
as barriers to the achievements sought. 
Accordingly, we argue that a set of 
contingencies – cultural, economic, strategic 
and political/legal – play a decisive role in the 
formation of international joint ventures. 
These contingencies are present in different 
intensities at different phases of the process 
of formation. The formation process in IJVs is 
initiated by the decision to enter into the IJV, 
the subsequent choice of an appropriate 
partner and, structure for the IJV and its 
dynamic evolution over time. Such evolution, 
because of the contingencies entailed, may 
not necessarily progress through the same 
sequence of events for all collaborative 
ventures (Gulati, 1998). Each collaborative 
venture will have a unique story – but their 
will be common elements that analysis can 
isolate. 
 
Intriciacies of Joint Ventures in 
Developing Countries 
When IJVs are between parent countries at 
different stages of development this factor 
will play an important role in the degree of 
complexity of international partnerships 
(Child and Rodrigues, 2000; Hyder, 1999; 
Beamish and Banks, 1987; Lane and 
Beamish, 1990). Differences in the 
development stages of the host countries 
tend to be accompanied by strong cultural 
and institutional differences, which may 
result, for instance, in higher transaction 
costs than for countries at more equivalent 
stages of development. Where partnerships 
are between firms from developed countries, 
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used to competing in the international 
market, there may be stronger power 
disputes over market share and technology, 
and thus have more to lose internationally, 
than a partner operating wholly within a 
domestic economy.    
Beamish and Banks (1987) and 
Dussauge and Garrette (1999) note that JVs 
are the dominant form employed by 
multinational firms in developing countries. 
Multinationals prefer joint ventures to wholly 
owned subsidiaries, regardless of whether or 
not they are required by host country 
conditions of entry. The use of joint venture 
by multinational companies is not restricted 
to situations where the international inward 
investing partner attends to host-country 
regulations (Dussauge and Garrette 1999). 
Joint ventures in emerging economies enable 
host countries to improve the level of their 
inward international investment, as for 
example in Brazil, China and Mexico 
(Rodrigues, 1999), although not all IJVs 
occur for this reason. Moreover, when the 
state relaxes the joint venture requirements, 
typically there is little or no diminution in 
number and rate of formation of joint 
ventures, suggesting that the local partner 
serves strategic purposes, as Dussauge and 
Garrette (1999) note. 
Beamish and Banks (1987) noted 
that IJVs in less developed countries are 
different in terms of their stability, autonomy, 
ownership, reasons for creating the venture, 
and management control. Such differences 
may be attributed to corporate governance 
variations, as Child and Rodrigues (2000, p. 
5), based on investigations carried out in two 
emerging economies – Brazil and China – 
highlight, and as Sinha (2001) suggests, 
agreeing with Beamish and Banks (1987). 
Supporting their argument, he stresses the 
higher rates of instability in IJVs in less 
developed countries where the foreign 
partners have a minority position . Many IJVs 
form because of government regulation in 
developing countries, he suggests, except 
where governments require the use of shared 
equity ventures as the price of entering their 
economies. While government requirements 
play a role, they are not the only determinant 
in the choice of shared-equity international 
joint ventures. National and organizational 
culture, and technological issues, can also 
play a determinant role in the choice. 
Hyder (1999) criticized the studies of 
multinational JVs in developing countries 
carried out by Beamish (1985; 1987; 1988). 
He claimed that the quantitative character of 
these studies resulted in a superficial analysis 
of the differences between developed and 
developing countries. Hyder (1999) 
implemented a qualitative study of four 
international joint ventures –between firms 
from developed countries with partners from 
developed countries in two cases with two 
with partners from developing countries, 
focusing on characteristics of developed and 
developing country JVs. The major 
differences were in terms of motives, degree 
of conflict, ownership level and types of 
relationships. In the developed country IJVs, 
conflicting goals dominated, at times being 
more important than mutual goals. The 
financial return was not a shared goal for 
both partners, as sometimes ambiguous 
individual goals dominated. Because of their 
physical and cultural distance from the 
developing country, the foreign partner 
consciously developed informal relationships 
with local associates over time, essential to 
solving conflicts. The local partners’ 
contributed support, mainly in the form of 
contacts with government authorities. The 
foreign partners made their major 
contributions in the field of technology, 
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production, product development, and quality 
control. For developing country IJVs there 
were complementary motives as all the 
partners considered the collaboration from a 
longer-term perspective and understood that 
they could only gain as long as the IJVs were 
in operation. 
Joint ventures are an intermediary 
form between market and hierarchy Often 
they are examined simply in terms of 
economic dimensions. However, any 
relationship between complex organizations, 
especially from different countries with 
different languages, cultures and stages of 
development, will necessarily involve power 
relations. It is a mistake to regard social and 
cultural dimensions as merely residual to the 
political intricacies of IJVs. Brazilian firms 
form international joint ventures for explicitly 
political motives: to acquire technology, to 
gain competitive advantage over local 
competitors, and access proprietary 
technologies, patents and power in the 
international market (Oliveira, Drummond 
and Rodrigues, 1999). Foreign partners seek 
to improve profitability through selling 
technology and management skills, desire 
access to structured commercialization 
channels, and lack knowledge of market, 
legislation, and local administrative practices, 
so they are also entering into a political 
compact. Inkpen and Beamish (1997) argue 
that firms access local knowledge as a means 
of overcoming market uncertainties to 
establish an operational presence in a 
country. They claim that, “IJVs provide low-
cost, fast access to new markets by 
‘borrowing’ a partner’s already-in-place local 
infrastructure”, such as sales forces, local 
plants, market intelligence, and a local 
marketing presence with knowledge of 
cultural traditions, norms, values, and 
institutional differences. Additionally, host 
country governments also have political 
agendas that shape their regulation of the IJV 
context. In theses situations equity shared 
IJVs are often used to obtain government 
support.  Foreign partners want knowledge of 
the local economy, politics and culture, and a 
supply of general managers from the local 
partner (Lane and Beamish (1990) and 
expect to contribute technology, 
management expertise, and global support 
(Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Regular 
technological improvements can be an 
important input for local firms. In the 
absence of host-government restrictions on 
foreign ownership IJVs are often the least 
cost alternative, where, for instance, an MNE 
has little previous experience in the 
subsidiary’s country or industry (Gomes-
Casseres 1988). Also, competitive pressures 
encourage internationalization in search of 
economies of scope and scale (Fey and 
Beamish 2001) which favours the IJV form 
because wholly owned subsidiaries often 
present cultural and institutional barriers. 
From the inwardly invested countries’ point of 
view, globalization offers a quick way to 
access technology, international brands and 
management knowledge (Harrigan 1988). To 
do so entails learning (Hyder, 1999; Powell, 
1998; Child and Faulkner, 1998; Hamel, 
1990), in which the learning expectations of 
the partners will be different: developed 
countries’ firms expect to learn about local 
environmentl technical and institutional 
characteristics while firms from developing 
countries expect access to international 
technology and best practices.  
 Beamish and Banks (1987) claim that 
IJVs can provide a better solution to the TCE 
problems of opportunism, small numbers 
dilemmas, and uncertainty in the face of 
bounded rationality, than wholly owned 
subsidiaries, seeing the enhanced revenue 
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potential of an IJV as higher than the costs 
associated with writing, executing and 
enforcing pricing agreements and restricting 
the transfer of intangible assets. Hennart 
(1988) also claims that minimization of 
transaction costs is one of the reasons behind 
joint venture formation, whether ‘scale’ joint 
ventures or ‘link’ joint ventures. The former 
are created when two or more firms jointly 
enter a contiguous stage of production, 
distribution, or a new market. All the 
partners make similar moves of forward or 
backward vertical integration, horizontal 
expansion, or diversification. Link JVs are not 
symmetrical but may be a vertical investment 
for one party and a diversification for another 
(Hennart, 1988, p.361-362). Hennart (1988) 
points out that IJVs strategically relate to 
four main objectives: 
1. Economies of scale and risk 
diversification 
2. Overcoming entry barriers into 
new markets 
3. Pooling of complementary 
knowledge 
4. Avoiding xenophobic reactions 
when entering a foreign market. 
Osborn and Baughn (1990) identify 
several factors underlying the choice of inter-
organizational governance forms in R&D, 
using TCE, international strategy, and 
organizational theory, based on empirical 
study of US-Japanese cooperation. IJVs and 
international contractual agreements are 
commonly used to exchange technology, 
products, and services across national and 
firm boundaries. High technological intensity 
is associated with contractual agreements 
and joint ventures that, by providing joint 
ownership and control over assets, may 
bypass market inefficiencies. Equity control 
also serves to align the interests of the 
parent firms, reducing the opportunism that 
may arise in contractual agreements. IJVs 
also facilitate superior monitoring and control 
mechanisms, because IJV owners may be 
legally entitled independently to verify 
financial information as well as to acquire 
information through direct observation, 
advantages that can compensate for high 
administrative costs. In sum, organizations 
are likely to form IJVs when joint R&D is 
present because it:  
1. Facilitates information flows 
2. Aligns the interests of the 
partners and reduces 
opportunism  
3. Provide a structure for day-to-day 
coordination 
4.  Enable parents’ to switch or 
defend current strategic postures 
when faced with overwhelming 
competitive forces  
5. Combine talents for competitive 
vigor 
 
Joint Ventures, Markets, Institutions, 
and Social Relations in Developing 
Countries 
International environmental changes have 
been highlighted as a central motive for 
cooperative strategies, related to changing 
market and institutional conditions. Markets 
are becoming more integrated and open 
because of economic blocks such as CEE, 
NAFTA and MERCOSUR. International 
economic organizations (IMF, OECD) pressure 
governments to minimize formal barriers in 
order to facilitate the flow of capital and 
goods between national economies.  
For small companies in less-
developed nations, globalization may mean 
domestic competition with multinational 
corporations. Cooperative IJV strategies 
represent alternative means for accessing 
international markets, through access to 
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economies of production, technology and 
support in foreign markets. For big 
companies, globalization tendencies open up 
new markets while intensifying domestic and 
regional competition. It is demand traits that 
suggest types of cooperative strategies 
needed while competitor traits suggest how 
firms will respond to these needs for 
cooperation (Harrigan 1988). The key traits 
are demand uncertainty, customer 
sophistication in assessing a product’s 
differentiation and their abilities to command 
customized products from vendors, 
infrastructure development, production 
technology, the volatility of competitive 
behavior, and the nature and extent of 
linkages between the venture and its owners. 
Highly uncertain environments are less suited 
for highly formalized venture agreements.  
Joint ventures are less risky to undertake 
where products have the long-term potential 
to remain differentiated. Uncertain 
environments demand more flexible 
strategies than IJVs and Harrigan (1988: 
149) suggests that “global industries are less 
hospitable environments for joint ventures 
than for less binding forms of cooperation, 
and ventures involving shared equity 
arrangements will be more prevalent where 
product configuration cannot be lent 
standardized across geographic markets 
because of the joint venture’s lower strategic 
flexibility.” Harrigan (1988: 157) sees 
fragmented industries as less attractive IJV 
settings because their firms are more likely 
to focus on “price-cutting tactics rather than 
non-price forms of competitive behavior”. 
Where IJVs can effectively consolidate a 
fragmented industry, then technical 
efficiencies may well replace price 
competition.  
 Child and Faulkner (1998), borrowing 
from Michael Porter (1980), highlight that a 
cooperative strategy may offer a mutually 
advantageous opportunity for collaborating 
firms to modify the position that they occupy 
within their industry. Through cooperative 
strategies firms may be able to increase their 
market power, subject to contextual 
contingencies such as customer bargaining 
power, supplier bargaining power, the 
existence of substitute products, and the 
intensity of industry competition. Gray (cited 
by Sharfman, Gray and Yan, 1991), identified 
six contextual factors creating an impetus for 
collaboration within and across sectors in the 
United States: 
1. Rapid economic and technological 
change 
2. Declining productivity growth and 
increasing competitive pressures 
3. Global interdependence 
4. Blurring of boundaries among 
business, government, and labor 
5. Shrinking federal revenues for 
social programs 
6. Dissatisfaction with the judicial 
process for solving problems. 
Some of these contextual factors are 
competitive in nature while others are 
institutional. Competitive forces can stimulate 
inter-firm collaboration, which in turn may 
enable the partners to enhance the scope and 
sophistication of their competition.  Firms can 
be forced to collaborate for survival’s sake, 
as shown by the transformation of the U.S. 
domestic automobile industry from an arena 
of cutthroat competition to one featuring 
several interorganizational alliances. Finally, 
competitive pressures influence the formation 
of IJVs to try and reduce the level of 
uncertainty 
 While strategic and economic benefits 
are core considerations when entering a 
cooperative venture (Lane and Beamish, 
1990) a number of contingencies shape both 
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the decision and choice of the partner. 
Institutional pressures can be exerted directly 
through coercion or indirectly through 
imitation or normative controls (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1991). Key contingencies include 
the role played by the state, cultural 
dimensions of the environment, and the 
nature of social relations. These dimensions 
are connected with each other.  
 The state is an important actor since 
it has the power to impose rules and change 
the economic and political environment 
(Fligstein, 1991). Greenwood, Suddaby, and 
Hinings (2002) demonstrate that governance 
systems can create and legitimate 
organizational forms.  Government actions 
can be associated with protection of local 
capital, creation of incentives for international 
capital, restrictions on international capital, 
protection of proprietary technological and 
control of core sectors, such as 
telecommunication, energy, and bank. All 
these aspects can influence the formation of 
IJVs. By considering the host-country 
governments’ position on international 
investments, Dussauge and Garrette (1999: 
75-76) highlight three main types of benefits 
that IJVs can offer:  
1. The foreign multinational 
becomes involved in the day-to-
day running of the local operation 
rather than remaining in a 
‘hands-off’ technology-provider 
position. Because of its stake in 
the IJV, the foreign partner will 
have a vested interest in making 
the operation a success.  
2. The multinational partner’s 
probability of adopting 
opportunistic behaviors reduces. 
Getting a local partner involved in 
the decision-making process can  
prevent the foreign firm from 
behaving in an overly detrimental 
to host-country interests.  
3. The integration of the host 
country into the world economy 
increases as a result of ‘intra-
firm’ trade between the IJV and 
other subsidiaries of the 
multinational partner.  
Dussauge and Garrette (1999) also 
argue that multinational companies can 
choose an IJV for reasons other than 
compliance with local legislation, when the 
local partner can contribute skills and assets 
that will increase the likelihood of 
successfully entering the target country. A 
good local partner will have a network of 
political and personal connections.  
Cultural dimensions can shape 
management practices in a way that causes 
tension in interorganizational cross-border 
relationships. National cultural differences 
may be associated with differential trust; it 
may be more difficult for a firm to build trust 
in interorganizational relationships where 
countries present a lack of understanding of 
the cultural mechanism behind managerial 
practices. Cultural differences produce 
communication failures that tend to result in 
conflicts. Although cultural differences 
between countries used to be viewed as a 
negative factor in organizational 
performance, Yeheskel, Zeira and Shenkar 
(2001) have shown that not all cultural 
differences are dysfunctional; instead some 
can be functional.  
 Social relations occur at the individual 
and organizational level. Social relations 
represent an important contingency in all 
kinds of organizational relationship by guiding 
the firm’s interest in new alliances, and by 
providing it with opportunities to realize that 
interest. Moreover, social networks of prior 
collaborative ventures provide an active 
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network of information exchange in which 
firms learn about the reliability and specific 
capabilities of current and potential partners 
(Gulati, 1998). Research on Italian networks 
shows that social relations play a central role 
as a coordination mechanism in production 
networks. Although North American firms 
present a more instrumental mode of 
operation, Uzzi (1997) shows that social 
relations were responsible for organizational 
success. Stevens and Beamish (1993) 
demonstrate that the establishment of 
personal relationships is central for Mexican 
managers, leading them to prefer to do 
business with Canadian rather than US 
organizations. For Mexican managers 
involved in successful interorganizational 
relationships personal relationships are a way 
to construct and build trust. Gulati (1998) 
observed that many new opportunities for 
collaborative ventures arise for firms through 
existing networks of partners. The previous 
experience of the partners is a crucial factor 
in explaining their choice of each other.  
Ebers (1997) pointed out that 
relational studies focus on how pre-existing 
social relations among the individuals in a 
region foster and support the development of 
more formal business networking 
relationships among organizations. Family 
and friendship ties among local business 
people, common membership in local trade 
associations, sports clubs, and political 
institutions, all create and sustain social 
networks of mutual obligation, loyalty, and 
trust. As an advantage, actors can economize 
on more formal contractual safeguards when 
conducting business with one another. Joint 
ventures consist of a type of network 
characterized by more formal contractual 
safeguards than agreements between a 
supplier/customer. Social relations play a role 
during the institutionalization process of the 
joint venture, as discussed by Ring and Van 
de Ven (1994).  
Notwithstanding the voluminous work 
that stresses the role markets, institutions 
and networks play in the formation of joint 
ventures, general, and their effects on 
international joint venture formation 
involving partners from developing countries, 
in particular, there is no cohesive synthesis of 
theoretical perspectives providing a 
framework that brings together the factors 
affecting IJV formation. It is to answering this 
need that we now turn. 
 
A Framework for International Joint 
Venture Formation involving developing 
countries  
Following a similar logic to that suggested by 
authors such as Grandori and Soda (1995) 
and Ebers (1997), we aim to use different 
theories to build an understanding of the 
formation of IJVs. According to Gulati (1998), 
some of the essential facets of firms’ 
behavior in IJV formation include the decision 
to enter a collaborative venture, the choice of 
an appropriate partner, the choice of 
structure for the collaborative venture, and 
the dynamic evolution of the collaborative 
venture as the relationship develops over 
time.  
 
Theoretical foundations 
The central theoretical perspectives in past 
studies of IJVs that pertain to the formation 
of such collaborative ventures include 
transaction cost economics (e.g., Parkhe 
1993), resource-dependence theory (e.g., 
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and institutional 
theory (Selznick’s (1949, 1957).  We will 
discuss each of these theories prior to 
articulating a framework for addressing IJV 
formation. 
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Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
TCE draws on concepts from industrial 
economics, such as concentration, size, rate 
of change and, client’s characteristics 
(Perrow, 1986), which it relates to 
assumptions of bounded rationality and 
opportunism. These concepts help explain the 
need for a specific governance structure as 
they indicate market failures and the best 
kind of contract for each situation. As such, 
TCE provides a basis for examining various 
governance mechanisms as well as a diverse 
set of institutions. And it provides a 
framework with which to reach a better 
understanding of both organizational strategy 
and firm’s market, competitive and 
technological environments (Hirsch, Friedman 
and Koza, 1990).  
While TCE has a role for bounded 
rationality it is limited in incorporating the 
social dimensions underlying behaviour; it 
produces an under-socialised view of 
organizational phenomena where actor are 
viewed as if they were self-contained atoms 
constituted outside of a social context. 
Atomisation results from a view of the actor 
premised on a narrow utilitarian pursuit of 
self-interest (Granovetter, 1985). The lack of 
consideration of both the effect of social 
structure and relations on organizational 
processes of production, delivery and 
consumption creates a highly abstracted and 
simplified model for understanding 
organizational realities. Nonetheless, TCE is a 
common approach to the study of joint 
ventures (Tsang 2000; Hennart, 1991; 1988; 
Kogut, 1991; Fey and Beamish, 2001; 
Gomes-Casseres, 1996). These studies 
advance Williamson’ work by explaining joint 
venture formation as resulting not only from 
a search for cost reduction but also point out 
elements derived from other theoretical 
approaches, such as a resource based-view 
(Tsang, 2000) and institutional theory (Chen 
and Boggs, 1998). Beamish and Banks 
(1987) acknowledge that JVs incur high 
administrative costs but highlight conditions 
where JVs provide a better solution to the 
problems of opportunism, small number 
dilemma and uncertainty, than wholly owned 
subsidiaries. They suggest that in situations 
where a joint venture is established in a spirit 
of mutual trust and commitment to its long-
term commercial success that opportunism is 
unlikely to emerge. In the absence of local 
partner opportunism, problems associated 
with a small number of bargains present 
much less serious transactional difficulties 
than normally might be expected.  
Efficiency is the central concept of 
TCE, defined in terms of comparative cost 
effectiveness (Hesterly, Liebeskind and 
Zenger (1990, p. 403). TCE presumes that 
efficient arrangements always prevail over 
those that are inefficient, through 
interorganizational competition and market 
discipline, following the survival of the fittest 
argument. However, competition always 
takes place in an inherent context of political 
issues, which frames organization actions. 
These political issues play an important role 
in maintaining organizational survival, 
independently of questions of efficiency. 
Politics frequently prevail over pure markets 
in the interests of survival on power-holders 
terms (Clegg, 1990; Hirsch, Friedman and 
Koza 1990; Perrow 1986: 247). According to 
Selznick (1957), the higher the level of 
authority, the less will be the applicability of 
the efficiency concept. This is because 
management is inherently political rather 
than purely technical. Technical activities can 
be standardized through scientific arguments 
and agreed standards (Brunsson et al, 2000) 
but political behaviours depend on many 
other elements – ideology, belief systems, 
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myths, ceremonies, and historical aspects – 
which require learning to be consensually 
understood. For instance, different standards, 
operationalizations and meaning may be 
associated with efficiency in different 
countries; incorporating elements associated 
with cultural context. In different cultural 
contexts managers may find it difficult to 
reach an agreement about IJV aspects such 
as appropriate control mechanisms and 
performance measures. Furthermore, the 
higher the level of authority, the less likely is 
agreement between foreign managers 
concerning efficiency.   
 Roberts and Greenwood (1997) make 
reference to Williamson and note that “few 
economists would insist on an unrelieved 
efficiency theory of economic organization” 
(Williamson, cited by Roberts and 
Greenwood, 1997, p.2). The use of 
institutional theory (IT) and TCE to develop a 
more potential analytical framework is also 
made in Hesterly, Lieberskind and Zenger 
(1990). They argue that IT may provide 
useful guidance in identifying and 
understanding the costs referred to in TCE. IT 
also highlights the role played by institutional 
mechanisms of isomorphism on the choice of 
governance structures. IT expands the 
elements needed to understand how and why 
interorganizational arrangements are chosen 
in relation to hierarchy or market in a more 
realistic way.   
TCE operates with a particular set of 
a priori values that are subject to 
contestation, going beyond the theoretical 
incongruence noted by a number of 
researchers (Perrow, 1986; Alter and Hage, 
1993; Roberts and Greenwood, 1997; Hirsch, 
Friedman and Koza, 1990; Slater and 
Spencer, 2000). Clegg (1990) describes 
these values as follow: first, organizations 
are an aberration from a more natural form 
of economic activity – exchange on the 
market, which is seen to maximize efficiency 
and personal liberty, criticizing the TCE 
explanation that if organizations produce 
monopolies as market failure then how can 
organization at the same time be the 
alternative to market failure? Clegg (1990) 
notes the dominance of the value of 
instrumental efficiency results from the 
emergence of contexts dominated by cultural 
conditions of rationalization. Such a cultural 
analysis supposes that institutionalisation of 
values is a determinant factor of certain 
types of organizations.  
 
Institutional Theory (IT)) 
Institutional theory’s origins in Selznick’s 
(1949; 1957) works show how rational 
aspects of organizations can be subverted by 
social aspects of organizations and their 
environments: organizations are not just 
bounded rational structures for reaching 
formal objectives and goals. Organizational 
goals are shaped as a result of the values 
and interests of organizational members and 
stakeholders. Cooptation is a central element 
in Selzick’s work, (and plays a key role on the 
formation of IJVs in developing countries). 
The dynamic of old institutionalism resulted 
from its focus on organizational change and 
vested interests in organizations, providing it 
with a political dynamic that helps explain the 
phases of joint venture formation: ‘new 
institutionalism’ does not address power or 
explain how institutions change (DiMaggio, 
1991; Dacin, Goodstein, Scott, 2002). New 
institutionalism emphasizes institutional 
mechanism of isomorphism and legitimacy as 
central elements in explaining the adoption of 
some kind of strategy and structure, such as 
collaborative ventures. Normative, cognitive, 
and coercive elements of the institutional 
environment are central to explain the 
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different phases of IJV formation. For 
example, government regulations (coercive), 
imitation to reduce uncertainty (cognitive) 
and the dissemination of internationalization 
models by professional consultants 
(normative) are significantly evident in 
international management.  
The concept of institution referred to 
by Selznick (1972) broke the traditional view 
of organizations as mere technical 
instruments for reaching goals and objectives 
or “as the structural expression of rational 
action” (Selznick, 1948, p.25).   Theorists of 
new institutionalism bring back Weber’s 
concept of legitimacy to say that the 
organizational environment cannot be 
reduced to exchanges relations in the 
market. Organizational environments must 
be conceived in terms of social and political 
elements shaping legitimacy for 
organizations. Legitimacy can be expressed 
by formal structure and administrative 
practices, independently of technical 
efficiency (Meyer and Rowan, 1991). 
Theorists of new institutionalism defend 
legitimacy as a central point in organizational 
survival. Both institutional approaches 
contribute to explaining the relation of 
organization/environment, although they do 
so by emphasizing different elements 
(cooptation and myths of rationality) and 
different notions of organizational 
environment (community and organizational 
field), approaches that are more 
complementary than divergent (Selznick 
1991). Institutional theory acknowledges 
environmental power in shaping 
organizational structure and in affecting 
performance. However, institutional theorists 
insert cognitive and normative dimensions in 
this process and conceive of social and 
cultural elements as organizational 
determinants using the mechanism of 
isomorphism to refer to institutional and 
competitive pressures in an organizational 
field (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, p. 64-65).   
Meyer and Rowan (1991) and Tolbert 
and Zucker (1983) developed the concept of 
isomorphism in relation to two organizational 
characteristics: structures and practices as an 
alternative to the dominance of rational 
formal structures, with their accounts based 
on the determinant role of the growing 
technical complexity of work demands, and 
insight that organizations arise in highly 
institutionalized contexts which guide them to 
incorporate dominant practices and 
procedures understood as rational by other 
organizations and institutions in the 
society/community. Thus, formal organization 
structures deeply reflect the myths of their 
institutional environments instead of the 
technical demands of their work. 
Organization isomorphism with 
environmental institutions has crucial 
consequences for organizations as they 
incorporate elements which are legitimated 
externally, rather than in terms of efficiency; 
they employ external or ceremonial 
assessment criteria to define the value of 
structural elements, and depend on 
externally fixed institutions to reduce 
turbulence and maintain stability. As a result, 
they affirm that isomorphism promotes the 
success and survival of organizations.   
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) agree with 
Meyer and Rowan (1991) by affirming that 
isomorphism proffers an alternative 
explanation of the homogenization of 
organizational forms. Homogenization 
happens at the level of organizational field 
because organizations share a specific 
environment (DiMaggio, 1991, p.267). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) point out that 
the structure of an organization only exists to 
the extent that it is institutionally defined. 
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The process of institutional definition or 
structuring consists of four parts: an increase 
on the extent of interaction among 
organizations; the emergence of sharply 
defined interorganizational structures of 
domination and patterns of coalition; an 
increase in the information load with which 
organizations contend, and the development 
of mutual awareness among participants in a 
set of organizations that they are involved in 
a common enterprise. When organizations 
from less developed countries present 
behavior isomorphic with that of 
organizations from developed countries, then 
where the organizational field of firms from 
less developed countries is low, these firms 
seek to imitate organizational practices of 
organizational already institutionalized and 
legitimated in others organizational fields.  
 
Resource Dependence (RD) 
Organizations are part of a social, economic, 
and political environment, where they seek 
resources to survive. The importance of 
certain kinds of resources for one 
organization, combined with their scarcity in 
the market, tends to produce a high degree 
of dependence from the controllers of these 
resources, in a debate fundamental to 
analysis of joint ventures, mainly in relation 
to motivations about the choice of a partner. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), with Mindlin and 
Aldrich (1975), give emphasis to the concept 
of organizational effectiveness. They 
emphasize that organizations survive 
because they are effective, an argument that 
is somewhat tautologous in its functionalism. 
Effectiveness stems from the management of 
demands, particularly from those interest 
groups on which the organization depends for 
resources and support. Aldrich and Pfeffer 
(1976) consider the issue of 
interorganizational relations to be a special 
case of the more general study of 
organization and of its environment. They 
view the environment as a powerful 
constraint on organizational action that 
managers can learn to navigate. Accordingly, 
the social coordination of interdependent 
actors is possible as a means for managing 
mutual interdependences with four primary 
benefits associated with the linkage:  
1) Information about the activities 
of that organization which may 
impinge on or affect the focal 
organization 
2) A linkage provides a channel for 
communicating information to 
another organization on which 
the focal organization depends 
3) Obtaining commitments of 
support from important 
elements of the environment 
4) Legitimating the focal 
organization. 
Developing Child’s (1972) ideas about 
strategic choice, Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976) 
emphasize that intraorganizational 
coordination is a power relation affected by 
environmental uncertainty produced by 
resource scarcity (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976, 
p.102). Joint ventures are a key example of 
coordination mechanisms among 
organizations because they make possible 
the sharing of information and commitment 
of resources. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p. 
154) argue that joint ventures can be 
analyzed from the perspective of uncertainty 
reduction and the development of an 
interorganizational collective structure. 
According to Child and Faulkner (1998), the 
resource dependence perspective, by 
focusing on the organizational necessity of 
resources, explains why organizations, 
particularly those transacting internationally, 
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undertake cooperative strategies (Child and 
Faulkner, 1998, p. 34). 
 
Implications for IJV Formation 
The decision to form an IJV 
Empirical research indicates that strategic 
motives, such as the acquisition of 
knowledge, the achievement of more market 
power, increasing organizational efficiency, 
as well as contingencies such as firm size and 
industry, are crucial issues in the decision to 
form a collaborative venture; thus, it is 
necessary to integrate elements of 
economics, social, political, and cultural 
issues to explain the decision to enter into an 
IJV... As Hamel (1990) argues, collaborative 
ventures are a race to obtain knowledge in 
which winners learns faster. Beyond these 
aspects, however, social issues, such as the 
embeddedness of the organization, come into 
play. CEOs can be stimulated by directors 
from other firms, with whom they maintain 
relationships, to see collaborative ventures as 
an alternative. The values shared by CEOs in 
an organizational field shape the legitimacy 
of the IJV as a practice (Haunschild 1993). 
Thus, management decisions to form an IJV 
with a partner from a developing country are 
affected by resource requirements and 
dependencies as well as the management’s 
social relationships and the 
institutionalization of IJVs involving 
developing countries. 
 
IJV Partner decision 
Gulati (1998) suggests the decision to form a 
collaborative venture is conditional on the 
availability of a good partner. Resource 
dependence theorists argue that the choice of 
a partner is related to the existence of a 
strategic interdependence between 
organizations located in the same 
environment. Firms seek partners able to 
reduce their interdependence through having 
complementary resources that are scarce or 
new, such as particular technologies. Not all 
interdependence between firms results in 
IJVs (Gulati 1998). Firms first need to learn 
about collaborative opportunities before 
interdependence comes into play. Social 
networks and information from previous 
relationships are fundamental for partner 
choice and, because of the risk of 
opportunistic behavior, are indispensable. 
While reputation is important when selecting 
a partner there are a number of other 
aspects that play a role in the decision about 
the partner, such as objectives and resources 
complementarities, geographical and cultural 
proximity (organizational and national 
culture), the existence of alternative 
partners, their financial condition, the domain 
of local institutional context, the technology 
and market domain, and the opportunity to 
be the first to propose an alliance. Firms with 
more social capital attract better partners. In 
other words, the social capital accumulated 
by one organization can be included as 
another variable in explaining the quality of 
partner choice.   
 
The choice of governance structure for an IJV  
Organizational cooperative arrangements 
vary significantly as a result of the degree of 
interdependence of the parent companies and 
the degree of autonomy expected. To 
Larange and Roos (1996), the lower the 
degree of interdependence, the closer will be 
the governance structure of governance to 
the hierarchy model, in this case, to joint 
ventures. The lower the degree of 
interdependence, the closer will be the 
structure to market governance. Gulati 
(1998) explains that when firms decide 
between governance structures the higher 
the anxiety about the merger by the partner, 
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the more hierarchical will be the structure of 
governance.  When there is risk of absorption 
by the partner the tendency is for a joint 
venture. Social embeddedness emphasizes 
the importance of trust among partners. 
Trust among firms refers to the belief that a 
partner will not explore the vulnerability of 
another partner (Gulati, 1998).  Thus, the 
choice of a particular governance structure 
with respect to an IJV involving a partner 
from a developing country can be explained 
using a synthesis of implications originating 
from TCE and IT. 
 
Dynamic evolution of an IJV 
Understanding the dynamic evolution 
of a collaborative venture provides critical 
insight into how ties are managed.  It is each 
partner’s sense of the future payoffs which is 
important. Gulati (1998) suggests there are 
specific stages in this sensemaking, in which 
the influence of the development stage of the 
parent companies countries, their technical 
and institutional contingences, and the 
relations of power in all phase of the 
formation process will shape the IJV. The 
process can be explained by combinbing 
elements from TCE, IT and RD in a 
complementary way to explain IJV formation.  
The theoretical model is presented in Figure 
1, as follows, which we will use to interpret a 
specific case study. 
 
 
 
Country stage
development of parent 
companies
Motives to form
IJVs
MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL
CONTINGENCES
Market
Culture
State
Social Relations
Power relations
Decision to 
form an IJV
The choice of an
appropriate IJV
The choice of structure 
for the IJV
The dynamic evolution
of the IJV
TCE
Costs reduction
Opportunism
Small number
Bounded rationality
Uncertainty
Assets specificity
IT
Organizational legitimacy
Coercive isomorphic pressures
Normative isomorphic pressures
Mimetic isomorphic pressures
RD
Interorganizational dependence 
reductions 
– technological, polical, and economic
 
Figure 1: Framework of IJV Formation for Developing Countries 
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The Case of Puig Memphis 
The empirical aspects of the paper 
investigate a case study of a joint venture 
formed between a Brazilian firm (Memphis 
Industrial) and a Spanish firm (Antonio Puig). 
This partnership resulted in the creation of 
the joint venture Puig Memphis, a Brazilian 
IJV. The study employs analysis of 
documents and files, in-depth interviews with 
one of the parent companies, Memphis 
Industrial’s senior managers and CEO as well 
as those from Puig Memphis. The interviews 
took place in 2001 and in 2003. This 
separation allowed study of the evolution of 
the partnership. The interviews took around 
one hour and were subsequently transcribed. 
The analysis of the data employed 
documentary and content analysis.  
  
Brazil and Spain – institutional characteristics 
While Brazil and Spain are at different stages 
of development, and thus one would expect 
that their institutional environment would 
present important differences, there are 
important cultural similarities (Hofstede, 
1980).  
Subsequent to the consolidation of 
liberalization and privatization of the Spanish 
economy, the main Spanish entrepreneurial 
groups, with the support of several state 
governors, started a strategy of international 
expansion in which Latin America was an 
important destination. In the 1990s this 
region became the main destination of 
Spanish investments, which, by 1998, 
represented 72% of total investment 
(Eurotendências, 2003). In the 1980s, 64% 
of Spanish investment was in the European 
Community, 8% in the US, and only 4% in 
Latin America (Eurotendências, 2003). 
The opening of the Brazilian market 
in the 1990s lead governments to develop 
programs to improve the quality of Brazilian 
products and to augment industrial 
productivity to reduce inefficiency and 
increase the scale of Brazilian companies to 
become more competitive and internationally 
oriented. 
Child and Rodrigues (2000), using the 
Global Competitiveness Report of 1999, 
analyzed the relationship between economic 
and institutional environment on the choice 
of IJVS governance structure in Brazil and 
China. By comparison with the US, Brazil and 
China rate lowly on legal system, institutional 
instability, freedom to negotiate IJVs without 
government interference, work ethic, 
management quality, management 
education, sophistication of financial markets, 
and effectiveness of supply chains although 
Brazil was more favorable institutionally in 
terms of its legal environment, more 
sophisticated financial market, and higher 
quality of management activities. Also, in 
Brazil company law regulates the governance 
of publicly held companies, including the 
rights of minority stakeholders.  
Compared with the Spanish 
institutional environment Brazil presents 
great challenges for market entry, including 
accessing channels of distribution, 
comprehending local trade practices, 
grasping the specificities of consumer 
behavior, in a context framed by a set of 
national and multinational companies with 
well structured commercial activities in the 
domestic market. Given these problems, a 
fast entrance, as planned by the Spanish 
company Antonio Puig, was almost 
impossible without a partnership although the 
existence of regulatory patterns, regulatory 
law applying to technological property and 
the existence of production infrastructure 
were favorable issues in Brazil for attracting 
IDE (Investment direct of exterior).  
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The perfume segment in Brazil and Spain 
In Brazil, during 1996 to 2001, the perfume 
sector had a 12% share in the cosmetic 
industry. In this same period, the sector grew 
around 9% per year (Garcia and Furtado, 
2002). In 2002 Brazil sold R$ 9.6 billions, 
against R$ 5.9 billions of perfume in 1998. 
The sales in the entire world were 
US$167,160 billions in 1998 against US$147 
billions in 1990. However, although Brazil 
presents a potentially big domestic market, 
its position as an exporter and importer in 
the international scene is not significant 
(Garcia and Furtado, 2002).  
 Perfumery in Brazil arrived at the end 
of the fourteenth century, with the 
Portuguese Court. By the end of 1960s, the 
main world fragrances were available in 
Brazil. In the 1990s, mainly after 1992, the 
main import firms became established. Brazil 
is one of the biggest market for cosmetics; in 
2000 it occupied the 4th position in the world 
market, accounting for 5.6% of the perfume 
consumed, reaching US$1,14 billions (Garcia 
and Furtado, 2002). Perfumery is one of the 
few Spanish industries to be internationally 
competitive. In 2002 Spain occupied the 10th 
position in term of consumption of cosmetics 
and 6th position as an exporter while Brazil, in 
2000, occupied the 28th position (Garcia and 
Furtado, 2002). Latin America has always 
been the main market for Spanish industries. 
In the case of Antonio Puig its share of 
market was greater in countries that spoke 
Spanish. In these countries, such as Chile 
and Mexico, Antonio Puig has subsidiaries 
and local partnerships. 
  
The IJV Puig Memphis and its parent 
companies: Antonio Puig and Memphis 
Industrial 
Antonio Puiig S. A. is part of Puig Beauty & 
Fashion Group, a multinational whose activity 
is based in the perfumery, cosmetics and 
fashion sectors. At the present their products 
are distributed in over 150 countries via a 
network of 40 subsidiaries. More than 5.000 
people work in this common project.  
Fragrances and personal care represent 48% 
of the group business. Among the brands 
with most prestige in the Group are Carolina 
Herrera, Nina Ricci, Paco Rabanne, and Payo. 
 Memphis, the Brazilian parent 
company, was founded in 1949 through a 
process of acquisition and remains a family 
business. The firm acquired a portfolio of 
products including soap, lotion, talcum 
powder, and others. In terms of market 
share, Memphis has around 4% of soap and 
5% of deodorant Sales. The Brazilian 
company, in terms of size, is much smaller 
then Puig Memphis but the difference is not 
significant compared to firms such as 
Johnson, Procter & Gamble, and Avon. 
Memphis had refused partnership with North 
American companies because of the risk of 
acquisition and because of the difficulty of 
maintaining direct contact with the owners. 
The IJV formed with Antonio Puig was the 
first collaborative venture in the history of 
Memphis Industrial. The firm was planning a 
collaborative venture; however, it was 
Antonio Puig that first approached Memphis 
to form a partnership.  
Puig Memphis S. A. , the IJV formed 
between the Spanish Company Antonio Puig 
with de Brazilian Company Memphis 
Industrial, was created in 1999 and formed in 
just three months. Antonio Puig controls 51% 
of the capital and Memphis Industrial 49%. 
Puig Memphis reached 1% of market share in 
the first year of its activities in Brazil. The 
main competitors are Natura (32% of market 
share), Avon (16% of market share) and, O 
Boticário (20% of market share). Boticário 
and Natura are Brazilian companies that 
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operate in the international market, including 
Europe, the Arabian Countries and Latin 
America. The main brands of Puig Memphis 
are Diavolo; Per Donna; Mediterraneo; 
Quorum, Ágata, Thaís; Água Brava; Água 
Brava Sea Power. 
 
Political, social, cultural and, economic 
dimensions in the process of forming the IJV 
Puig Memphis 
Forming a relation: Memphis Industrial had 
been seeking an international partnership for 
five years. In 2002 the strategic plan 
presented an emphasis on the intention to 
form a strategic collaborative venture. 
Memphis sought a partnership that could 
offer international brands, marketing 
technology, and products with greater value. 
The firm wanted to enter into a collaborative 
venture to reduce the risk of dependence on 
just one business alternative.  The 
expectative of Antonio Puig was to find a firm 
with the capacity to distribute their products 
rapidly to reach the entire Brazilian market 
without making high investments. 
 In the era of globalization big 
distributors seek suppliers with access to 
dominant distributors, such as, in Brazil, the 
Carrefour supermarket. Anonio Puig sought a 
partnership to reduce investments, share 
risks and speed up access to local markets. 
The collaborative venture afforded Memphis 
the option of entering into a new business for 
which they did not have the technology. In 
exchange, Memphis offered access to their 
delivery chains. Beyond that, Memphis 
offered the legitimacy and prestige of a brand 
with more than fifty years presence in the 
Brazilian market in which personal and 
organizational reputation plays an important 
role. 
 Cooperative governance 
arrangements reduce transaction costs in 
international trade.  Antonio Puig did not 
choose to contract a local distributor to 
distribute the semi-exclusive perfumes 
because that meant running the risk of 
opportunistic behavior and the assumption of 
considerable risk: the local distributor might 
not accept the brand priorities of Antonio 
Puig. Thus, from the outset Antonio Puig did 
not want a wholly owned subsidiary with high 
costs of production, wage and salary costs 
and those associated with building a 
distributional structure. For Memphis, the 
possibility of sharing entrance costs in a new 
business through an IJV was an efficient cost 
reduction alternative. Through the IJV, the 
firm gained access to the technology of 
perfume production, international brands, 
and sophisticated global marketing 
knowledge. 
From an IT approach, for Antonio 
Puig, Brazil’s complex and hardly mature 
institutional environment positively influenced 
the choice of a partnership. For Memphis, the 
institutional environment of the 1990s was 
favorable for strategic collaborative ventures 
as legitimate alternatives for companies. The 
Memphis CEO saw the theme of collaborative 
ventures as much in evidence and all their 
managers had experienced the idea in 
training programs and academic courses.    
Memphis had the production 
technology for popular products of low cost. 
From a RD perspective, Memphis sought a 
strategy to manage environmental 
interdependences., especially acquiring 
technology to enter the new business of 
semi-exclusive perfumes.  To do so, Memphis 
would need to invest highly in R&D to gain 
knowledge of production and marketing 
techniques. Memphis also required 
international brands  to enter semi–exclusive 
perfumes segment. The joint venture made it 
possible to access these commercial assets, 
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opening the market for Memphis.  Another 
Memphis dependence was associated with 
financial and human resources: the IJV 
became feasible as a way of managing these 
areas of environmental interdependences for 
both companies.  
 
Choosing IJV partners: In 1999, Antonio Puig 
contracted a New York bank to study Brazil in 
order to select firms with a significant market 
share in the cosmetics market. The firms 
should also have the capacity to deliver 
products in all of the national territory. 
Memphis was chosen because it met all 
criteria and had technology and production 
capacity.  
Memphis saw several advantages in 
forming a collaborative venture with Antonio 
Puig beyond gaining international brands and 
marketing technology. According to the CEO 
of Memphis, the fact that Antonio Puig is one 
of the biggest perfumery companies in the 
world and that they have activities in more 
than a hundred countries, with considerable 
expertise and a trajectory of success, was 
important. In other words the partnership 
met the requisites emphasized by Larson 
(1992) as fundamental – that is reputation as 
a condition for starting a process of 
negotiation. A strong reputation by one of the 
partners in an industry provides the benefit 
of institutionalized product quality.   
For Memphis, the fact that Antonio 
Puig was a family company produced a high 
sense of security because each set of family 
owners was able directly to negotiate with 
the other. As well as congruent values, some 
key differences were also attractive. Antonio 
Puig is known for its emphasis on marketing 
while Memphis emphasized costs and 
production.  
Social relations played an important 
role in the consolidation of the partnership, in 
accord with Ring and Van de Ven’s (1994) 
argument. Both firms saw the IJV as an 
alternative to reduce dependences imposed 
by the technical and institutional 
environment. Considering the technical 
aspects, the partners gained scarce resources 
that were fundamental for entering that 
market. For Antonio Puig, the dependences 
were associated with knowledge of the 
institutional context and access to channels 
for the products, which the partner 
possessed.  
Institutional issues, including 
legitimacy, influenced both firms. Personal 
and organizational reputations acknowledged 
during the negotiation process sped up the 
process. from the point of view of the 
Brazilian CEO the Spanish team comprised 
felicitous people, sensible, friendly and 
respecting of the Brazilians. For Brazilian 
people these aspects were very important 
and made the process of communication 
easier.  
  
Structuring the collaborative venture: 
Memphis was reluctant to admit capital from 
other firms, displaying traditional institutional 
and cultural characteristics of Brazilian family 
businesses. The IJV was a governance 
structure not often previously employed by 
Antonio Puig. According to the Chief Financial 
Officer of Puig-Memphis, the choice of this 
kind of governance structure for the IJV by 
Antonio Puig was a consequence of the high 
complexity of the Brazilian market, the 
complexity of political tax regimes and their 
frequent changes. Moreover, Brazilian 
regional differences posed serious challenges 
in organizing a delivery structure, because of 
the size of the country and the imbalance of 
regional development. A local partner 
minimized the need for capital and would 
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already have an established technological 
base. 
During the definition of the structure 
of the JV itself, it was evidently the attention 
of Memphis to maintain control of the firm’s 
activities. In this sense, the CEOs established 
in the contract that, although Antonio Puig 
had capital control, Memphis would be 
responsible for administrative and production 
control. Concerning to the allocation of CEOs, 
the control of marketing stayed with Antonio 
Puig and the control of the administrative and 
financial departments stayed with Memphis, a 
situation that met the expectations of both 
companies.  According to the CEO of Puig-
Memphis, control of the marketing 
department enforced the intention of Antonio 
Puig in defining the political stakes as the 
brands of Antonio Puig were one of its main 
assets, having reached an international level 
of development. 
The advantages visualized by Antonio 
Puig in forming an IJV for entering into the 
Brazilian market fitted with the advantages 
described by Barkema and Vermeulen 
(1997), which affirm that a JV makes it 
possible for a firm to share the costs and 
risks of entrance in a new market and, at the 
same time, makes possible the use of 
knowledge of the local partner about the 
institutional context, consumer preferences 
and business practices. Based on Fey and 
Beamish (2001) one can confirm that Antonio 
Puig also chose a JV as the best alternative to 
bypass cultural and institutional barriers, 
confirmed in this case, after two years of the 
partnership, by Antonio Puig recognizing that 
Memphis’ local market knowledge  was highly 
significant in their specific segment of 
perfumery.  
 
Dynamic evolution of the IJV: Antonio Puig 
did not mean to create a local subsidiary to 
explore the Brazilian market: the CEOs of the 
Puig Memphis IJV meant the partnership to 
be an agreement for the long term. The IJV is 
doing well and meeting the expectations of 
both partners, having reached first position in 
terms of its capacity for national distribution 
of perfumery to retailers. Memphis obtained 
marketing technology for products with more 
aggregated value and incorporated new 
practices of production as a result of their 
direct contact between researchers and 
managers from the foreign partners. In 
general what they gained was tacit 
knowledge that couldn’t be passed by an 
instruction manual. According to local 
managers from Memphis, if they had to 
decide do the partnership again, they would 
do it at the same way. For the president of 
Memphis, some operational issues and 
market projects could have been done with 
more precision and realism but these 
problems did not affect the relationship 
between them. According to the Memphis 
CEO, commitment and continuity were 
achieved because they developed strong 
trust. Moreover, the trust between them 
made it easy to adjust the contract and 
maintain accord for aspects not anticipated.   
The dynamic evolution of the IJV 
meant both firms gained better visibility and 
legitimacy in the institutional environment, 
which was not an explicit objective. After the 
establishment of the partnership, national 
and international firms gave more attention 
to negotiation with Memphis because of the 
fact that it was working with a famous 
company. On the other side, the Spanish 
company Antonio Puig became acknowledged 
in Brazil; as a consequence entrance to other 
business became easier.   
The economic performance has not 
yet met the level expected by Antonio Puig 
and Memphis Industrial. The continuity of the 
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collaborative venture can be explained by a 
belief that the results were not as expected 
because of macro-issues in the national 
scene. The results were sufficiently positive 
to justify the collaboration. Also, as Ring and 
Van de Ven’s (1994) propose, there exists a 
powerful social-psychological motivation for 
preserving relationships that involve 
investments in specific transactions.   In this 
sense, one can explain the continuity of the 
collaboration as a result of social relations far 
beyond the economic outcomes.   
Another explanation for the continuity 
of the collaborative venture comes from 
Inkpen and Beamish (1987): endogenous 
facts helped to maintain the collaborative 
venture, such as: 1) both partners 
maintained the strategic mission; 2) the IJV 
continues being important for both parent 
companies; 3) finally, it was not developed 
from a competitive rivalry. Beyond these 
aspects, environmental issues were favorable 
too, such as: the stability of Brazilian 
legislation for international investments and 
for property rights, changes in either of which 
could be negative for the foreign company. 
Changes in the political regime did not occur 
that could produce environmental instability. 
Finally, great changes did not happen in the 
bargaining power between the companies, 
associated with the knowledge acquisition, 
which might permit one of the partners to 
eliminate the other.  Social control was based 
on self-regulation with a moral dimension, as 
already verified in other collaborative dyads 
by Larson (1992). Moral commitment guided 
the partners to avoid distrust or behavior that 
could affect the integrity of the partner and 
of their members, and was enforced in the 
discourse of all Memphis CEOs, as well those 
CEOs that composed the IJV Puig Memphis.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Understanding the IJV between the 
companies requires a framework that 
integrates IT, RD, and TCE, as demonstrated 
in the model that we constructed. Both 
economic and strategic motives played a 
central role, evident in the fact that the 
partners did not have prior contact and did 
not share the same social space. However, 
the social relations established between the 
CEOs of the parent companies were decisive 
for the speed of the agreement and for 
defining the partnership and, ultimately, the 
IJV.  
The application of the framework 
shows that developing an integrated 
perspective which accounts for TCE, IT and 
RD provides a better understanding of the 
process of the formation of the IJV. If 
analysis had been based just on TCE and had 
not considered issues such as reputation, 
cultural, and social relations, it would not 
have been possible to comprehend the 
processes of institutionalization that occurred 
in the IJV. Nor would it be possible to explain 
the decision about the choice of the 
governance structure – in this case an IJV – 
without RD theory.  Seeking to reduce 
transaction costs was a key concern for both 
parent companies in all phases of the process 
of the formation of the IJV. The development 
stage of the home countries parent 
companies was fundamental in framing the 
partners’ motives for entering into the 
collaborative venture and the decision about 
choice of partner. We noticed that these 
comparative differences enhanced the 
importance of IT and RD in explaining the 
role of political, social and, cultural variables. 
We can hypothesize that the greater the 
institutional distance among partner 
countries the more relevant will be the use of 
approaches that do not reduce the IJV 
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formation process to a purely economic 
phenomenon. 
To sum up: we found that a 
perspective that focused on one or other of 
cultural, political, and economic perspectives 
was insufficient. Elements of each 
perspective were necessary to understand 
the different phases of the alliance formation 
process. The specificities of national cultures 
(economic and political stability, language, 
historical proximity and similarities, 
international image), organizations (their 
cultures, types of governance, levels of social 
interaction among CEOs, and the ethnicity of 
CEOs and companies` founder) were all 
important. Thus, we emphasized the 
necessity of developing qualitative and 
longitudinal studies that make it possible to 
understand in depth how specific contextual 
elements are related to each phase of the 
process. 
 
Gestão.Org, v. 5, n. 2, Mai/Ago, 2007 – www.gestao.org.dca.ufpe.br  
Institutional environments in the formation of international joint venture: a brazilian case study 194
References 
 
Aldrich, Howard E., Jeffrey Pfeffer.  
1976 “Environments of organizations”. Annual Review of Sociology. Palo Alto, CA, v. 2, p. 79-105. 
Barkema, Harry G.,  Oded Shenkar, Freek Vermeulen, and John H Bell  1997 “Working abroad, 
working with others: how firms learn to operate international joint ventures”. Academy of 
Management Journal. Mississippi State, v. 40, n. 2, p. 426-442 
Beamish, Paul  
1985 “The characteristics of joint ventures in developed and developing countries”. Columbia 
Journal of World Business. New York, 20 (3), p. 13-19. 
Beamish, Paul  
1987 “Joint ventures in LDCs: partner selection and performance”. Management International 
Review. Gütersloh, Germany, 27 (1), p. 23-37. 
Beamish, Paul  
1988 International Joint Ventures in Developing Countries. London: Routledge. 
Beamish, Paul W., John C Banks 
1987. “Equity joint ventures and the theory of the multinational enterprise”. Journal of 
International Business Studies. Ann Arbor, MI, v.18, p. 1-16, Summer. 
Brunsson, N., Jacobsson, B.,& associates  
2000 A world of standards. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Chen, Roger; David J Boggs  
1998 “Long-term cooperation prospects in international joint ventures”. Journal of Applied 
Management Studies. Tucson, AZ, v. 7 (1), p. 111-126. 
Child, John  
1972 “Organization, structure, environment, and performance: the role of strategic choice”. 
Sociology: The journal of the British Sociological Association [BSA]. London, 6(??), 1 - 22 
Child, John, David Faulkner 
 1998 Strategies of cooperation: managing alliances, networks, and joint ventures. Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Child, John, Suzana B Rodrigues,.  
2000 “Corporate governance in international joint ventures: Toward a theory of partner 
preferences”. International Management and Organization Group. Birmingham Business School. 
Working paper.  
Clegg, Stewart R.  
1990 Frameworks of power. London: Sage. 
Dacin, M. Tina; Jerry Goodstein, and. Richard W SCOTT 
2002 “Institutional theory and institutional change: introduction to the special research forum”. 
Academy of Management Journal. Mississippi State, v. 35 (1), p. 45-57. 
DiMaggio, Paul J.  
1991 “Constructing an organizational field as a professional project: U.S. art museums, 1920-
1940”. In: Powell, W., Paul J. DiMaggio. The new institutionalism in organizational analysis. 
Chicago, London, The University of Chicago Press, 1991. 267-292. 
DiMaggio, Paul J., Walter W. Powell 
1983 “The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational 
fields”. American Sociological Review. Ann Arbor, MI, v. 48, p. 147-160. 
Dussauge, Pierre, Bernard Garrette 
1999 Cooperative strategy: competing successfully through strategic alliances. New York: Wiley. 
Ebers, Mark 
1997 The formation of inter-organizational networks. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
EUROTENDÊNCIAS. Espanha – privatizações, “núcleos duros” e grupos bancários: uma análise da 
estratégia de internacionalização de Espanha. (http:\\www.dpp.pt/pt/Eurotendencias.htm acessado 
em outubro de 2003.)  
Fey, Carl F., Paul W Beamish 
2001 “Organizational climate similarity and performance: international joint ventures in Russia”. 
Organization Studies. Berlin, New York, v. 22/5, p. 853-882. 
FLIGSTEIN, Neil 
1991 “The structural transformation of American Industry: an institutional account of the causes of 
diversification in the largest firms, 1919-1979”. In: Powell, W. W., P. J. DiMaggio, The New 
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991. p. 293-
310. 
Garcia, Renato, João Furtado 
Gestão.Org, v. 5, n. 2, Mai/Ago, 2007 – www.gestao.org.dca.ufpe.br 
Fernando Dias Lopes, Stewart Clegg, Marcelo Milano Falcão Vieira e Sigg Gudergan 
 
195
2002 Estudo da competitividade de cadeias integradas no Brasil: impactos das zonas de livre 
comércio. Cadeia: cosméticos. Campinas: UNICAMP-IE-NEIT. 
Gomes-Casseres, B. 
1988 “Joint Ventures Cycles: The evolution of ownership strategies of U.S. MNEs, 1945-75”. In: 
Contractor Farok, Peter Lorange, (eds.). Cooperative strategies in international business. 
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988. p. 111-127. 
Gomes-Casseres, B.  
1996 The alliance revolution: the new shape of business rivalry. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Granovetter, Mark.  
1985 “Economic action and social structure: the problem of embededdness”. American Journal of 
Sociology. Chicago, Illinois, v. 91, p. 481-510. 
Grandori, Anna and Giuseppe Soda 
1995 “Inter-firm networks: antecedents, mechanisms and forms”. Organization Studies. Berlin, 
New York, v. 16 (2), p. 183-214. 
Greenwood, Royston, Roy Suddaby, and C. R. Hinnings  
2002 “Theorizing change: the role of professional associations in the transformation of 
institutionalized fields”. Academy of Management Journal. Mississippi State, v. 45 (1), p. 58-80. 
Gulati, Rajay.  
1995 “Social structure and alliance formation patterns: a longitudinal analysis”. Administrative 
Science Quarterly. Ann Arbor, v. 40, p. 619-652. 
Gulati, Rajay.  
1998 “Alliances and networks”. Strategic Management Journal. Hoboken, NJ, v. 19, p. 293-317. 
Gulati, Rajay, , James D. Westphal  
1999 “Cooperative or controlling? The effects of CEO-board relations and the content of interlocks 
on the formation of joint ventures”. Administrative Science Quarterly. Ann Arbor, v. 44, p. 473-
506. 
Haunschild, Pamela R.  
1993 “Inter-organizational imitation: the impact of interlocks on corporate acquisition activity”. 
Administrative Science Quarterly. Ann Arbor, n. 38, p. 564-92. 
Hamel, Gary Paul.  
1990 Competitive collaboration: learning, power and dependence in international strategic 
alliances. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI. Thesis (Ph.D.), University of Michigan. 
Harrigan, Kathryn Rudie
1988 “Joint venture and competitive strategy”. Strategic Management Journal. Hoboken, NJ, v. 9, 
p. 141-158. 
Hennart, Jean-François.  
1988 “Joint ventures and competitive strategy”. Strategic Management Journal. Hoboken, NJ, v. 9, 
p. 361-74. 
Hennart, Jean-François  
1991 “The transaction costs theory of joint ventures: an empirical study of Japanese subsidiaries in 
the United States”. Management Science. Evanston, IL, v. 37, n. 4, p. 484-497, April. 
Hennart, J-F., Ming Zeng 
2002 “Cross-cultural differences and joint venture longevity”. Journal of International Business 
Studies. Ann Arbor, MI, v. 33, n. 4, p. 699-716. 
Hesterly, William S., Julia Liebeskind, and Todd R Zenger 
1990 “Organizational economics: an impending revolution in organization theory?” Academy of 
Management Review. New York, v. 15, n. 3, p. 402-420. 
Hirsch, Paul M., Ray Friedman,; Mitchell P. Koza 
2000 “Collaboration or paradigm shift? Caveat emptor and the risk of romance with economic 
models for strategy and policy research”. Organization Science. v. 1 (1). 
Hyder, Akmal S.  
1999 “Differences between developed and developing country joint ventures – a reality or a myth?” 
International Business Review. Orlando, FL, v. 8, p. 441-461. 
IBGE. Comunicação social. 29 de setembro de 2003. IBGE lança estatísticas do século XX. 
Inkpen, Andrew C., Paul Beamish 
1997 “Knowledge, bargaining power, and the instability of international joint ventures”. Academy 
of Management Review. New York, v. 22, n. 1, p. 177-202. 
Kogut, Bruce 
1991 “Joint venture and the option to expand and acquire”. Management Science. Evanston, IL, v. 
37, n. 1, p. 19-33, April . 
Lane, Harry, Paul Beamish 
1990 “Cross-cultural cooperative behavior in joint ventures in LDCs”. Management International 
Review. Gütersloh, Germany, v. 30, p. 87-102. 
Gestão.Org, v. 5, n. 2, Mai/Ago, 2007 – www.gestao.org.dca.ufpe.br  
Institutional environments in the formation of international joint venture: a brazilian case study 196
Larson, Andrea 
1992 “Network dyads in entrepreneurial settings: a study of the governance of exchange 
relationships”. Administrative Science Quarterly. Ann Arbor, v. 37, p. 76-104. 
Lorange, Peter, John Roos 
1996 Alianças estratégicas: formação, implementação e evolução. São Paulo: Atlas. 
Luo, Yadong 
2001 “Antecedents and consequences of personal attachment in cross-cultural cooperative 
ventures”. Administrative Science Quarterly. Ann Arbor, v. 46, p. 177-201. 
Meyer, John W.  
1994 “Social environments and organizational accounting”. In: W. Richard. Institutional 
environments and organizations: structural complexity and individualism. London, Sage, p. 121-
136. 
MEYER, John W., Brian Rowan 
1977 Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremony. American Journal of 
Sociology. Chicago, Illinois, v. 83, p. 340-363. 
MEYER, John W., Brian Rowan 
1991 Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremony. In: Powell, W., Paul 
J. DiMaggio. The new institutionalism in organizational analysis. Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1991. 41-62. 
Mindlin, Sergio E., Howard Aldrich 
1975 Inter-organizational dependence: a review of the concept and a reexamination of the findings 
of the Aston Group. Administrative Science Quarterly, Ann Arbor, v. 20, p. 382-392.. 
Oliveira, Virgínia I., Aldemir Drummond, and Suzana B. Rodrigues  
1999 Joint venture: aprendizagem tecnológica e gerencial. In: Suzana B. Rodrigues, (org.). 
Competitividade, alianças estratégicas e gerência internacional. São Paulo: Atlas, 1999. p. 99-121. 
Osborn, Richard N., C. Christopher Baugh 
1990 Forms of inter-organizational governance for multinational alliances. Academy of 
Management Journal. Mississippi State, v. 33, n. 3 p. 503-519. 
Perrow, Charles 
1986 Complex organizations: a critical essay. New York, Yale University: McGraw-Hill. 
Pfeffer, Jefrey, Gerald Salancik 
1978 The external control of organizations: a resource dependence perspective. New York: Harper 
and Row. 
Powell, Walter W., Paul J. DiMaggio 
1991 The new institutionalism in organizational analysis. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. 
Powell, Walter W.  
1998 Learning from collaboration: knowledge and networks and pharmaceutical industries. 
California Management Review. Berkeley, CA, v. 40, n. 3, p. 228-240. 
Ring, Peter S.; Andrew. H. Van de Ven 
1994 Developmental processes of cooperative inter-organizational relationships. Academy of 
Management Review. New York, v. 19/1, p. 90-118. 
Rodrigues, Suzana B.  
1999 Formação de alianças estratégicas em países emergentes: o caso Brasil-China. In: Rodrigues, 
Suzana B. (org.). Competitividade, alianças estratégicas e gerência internacional. São Paulo: Atlas. 
1999. p. 183-205. 
Roberts, Peter W., Royston Greenwood 
1997 Integrating transaction cost and institutional theories: toward a constrained-efficiency 
framework for understanding organizational design adoption. Academy of Management Review. 
New York, v. 22, p. 346-373, April.. 
Selznick, Philip 
1953 TVA and the Grass Roots: A study in the sociology of formal organization. Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press. 
Selznick, Philip 
1972 A liderança na administração: uma interpretação sociológica. Rio de Janeiro. FGV,. 
Selznick, Philip 
1996 Institutionalism “Old” and “New”. Administrative Science Quarterly. Ann Arbor, v.41, p. 270-
277. 
Slater, Gary, David A. Spencer 
2000 The uncertain foundations of transaction costs economics. Journal of Economic Issues. 
Manchester, v. .XXXIV, n. 1, p. 61-87. 
Sharfman, Mark P., Barbara Gray, and Aimin Yan 
1991 The context of inter-organizational collaboration in the Garment Industry: an institutional 
perspective. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science. London, v. 27, n. 2, p. 181-208, jun. 
Stevens, Dennis, Paul W. Beamish 
Gestão.Org, v. 5, n. 2, Mai/Ago, 2007 – www.gestao.org.dca.ufpe.br 
Fernando Dias Lopes, Stewart Clegg, Marcelo Milano Falcão Vieira e Sigg Gudergan 
 
197
1993 Forging alliances in Mexico. Business Quarterly. V. 58 (2), winter, p. 79-84. 
Tolbert, Pamela S., Lynne G. Zucker 
1983 Institutional sources of change in the formal structure of organizations: the diffusion of civil 
service reform, 1880-1935. Administrative Science Quarterly. Ann Arbor, n. 28, p. 22-39. 
Tsang, Eric W. K.  
2000 Transaction cost and resource-based explanation of joint ventures: a comparison and 
synthesis. Organization Studies. Berlin, New York, v. 21, n. 1, p. 215-242, 2000. 
Uzzi, Brian.  
1997 Social structure and competition in inter-firm networks: the paradox of embedded ness. 
Administrative Science Quarterly. Ann Arbor, v. 42, p. 35-67, 1997. 
Yeheskel, Orly, Yoram Zeira, and Oded Shenkar 
2001 Parent company dissimilarity and equity international joint venture effectiveness. Journal of 
International Management.  Philadelphia, PA, v. 7, n. 2, p. 81-104. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gestão.Org, v. 5, n. 2, Mai/Ago, 2007 – www.gestao.org.dca.ufpe.br  
